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Sex, Love Letters, and Vicious Rumors: Anticipating
New Situations Creating Sexually Hostile Work
Environments*
l.

INTRODUCTION

"Let every feeble rumor shake your heans! "1
When Virginia Congressman Howard Smith took the House floor on
August 23, 1964, he intended to derail the civil rights bill then being
argued before Congress by proposing that a single word be added to the
measure. His proposal was simple: he would merely insert the word
"sex" into the existing language on race and national origin. That, he
believed, would be enough to ensure that Congress would never pass the
bill. 2
Much to the surprise of Congressman Smith, his proposal was almost
immediately accepted 3 and incorporated into one of the most influential
*

Copyright® 1995 by Chad W. King.
I. WILUAM SHAKESPEARE, CORIOLANUS III.iii.125.
2. See Robert Stevens Miller, Jr., Sex Discrimination and Title Vll of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,51 MINN. L. REV. 877, 884 (!967); Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1167
(1971).
Some commentators argue that Congressman Smith intended his proposal merely as a
joke. See 110 CONG. REc. 2547-78 (1964) (Congressman Smith commenting on a letter he
received from a female constituent); Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199,204 (3d
Cir. 1975); Sex and Nonsense, NEW REPUBUC, Sept. 4, 1965, at 10.
Other scholars have pointed out that regardless of Smith's intentions, the majority of
Congress did not add the language simply so they could share in his odd sense of humor. See
Michael Evan Gold, A Tale of Two Amendments: The Reasons Congress Added Sex to Title VII
and Their Implication for the Issue of Comparable Worth, 19 DUQ. L. REV. 453, 457-69
( 1981); II 0 CONG. REc. 2579-81 ( 1964) (Representatives Griffiths and St. George speaking
at length about employer discrimination against women).
3. Members of the House had little to say about Smith's proposed addition, and floor
debate was brief, filling only eight pages in the House Records. 110 CONG. REc. 2547,257784 (1964). Smith himself had scarcely a paragraph to say on the proposal:
I think we all recognize and it is indisputable fact that all throughout industry women
are discriminated against in that just generally speaking they do not get as high
compensation for their work as do the majority sex. Now, if that is true, I hope that
the committee chairman will accept this amendment. That is about all I have to say
about it . . . .
/d. at 2577. Smith then proceeded to read a letter from a constituent allegedly showing that
every woman should have the right to a "husband of her own." /d. Ironically, the most intense

341

342

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 9

pieces of twentieth century legislation-the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 4
Rather than frustrating passage of the bill as Congressman Smith
intended, his addition has instead frustrated countless courts, agencies,
attorneys, and employers as they attempt to define sexual discrimination
and its progeny, sexual harassment. 5
Presently, two types of sexual harassment are recognized by the
courts: quid pro quo harassment and hostile work environment harassment. 6 Quid pro quo harassment occurs when "submission to or
rejection of [unwelcome sexual] conduct by an individual is used as the
basis for employment decisions affecting [an] individual, " 7 such as when
an employee receives or is denied advancement based on his or her
willingness to perform sexual favors. Victims of quid pro quo harassment are often injured economically since their jobs, promotions, and pay
scales depend primarily, and sometimes exclusively, on their acquiescence to sexual demands.
Sexually hostile work environment harassment8 is "conduct [that]

opposition to the proposal came from an ardent feminist, Congresswoman Edith Green, who
recognized that the proposed addition was a ploy to defeat the legislation. See id. at 2581.
4. For additional insights into the history of Title VII, see F. KENNEDY & W. PEPPER,
SEX DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 1-19 (1981); Richard K. Berg, Equal Employment
Opportunity Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 BROOK. L. REv. 62 (1965); Miller, supra
note 2; Francis J. Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDus. & CoM. L. REv. 431
(1966); Developments in the Law, supra note 2; Anthony R. Mansfield, Note, Sex Discrimination in Employment Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 21 VAND. L. REv. 484
(1968).
5. In attempting to defeat the Act, Congressman Smith would have been wise to craft
his language taking heed of Sir Walter Scott's warning: 0, what a tangled web we weave/when
first we practise to deceive. SIR WALTER Scarr, MARMION: A TALE OF FLOOD EN FIELD 617
(1808) (to which J.R. Pope responded, But when we've practised quite a while/How vastly we
improve our style. J.R. POPE, A WORLD OF ENCOURAGEMENT, reprinted in COLUMBIA
DICTIONARY OF QuarATIONS 521 (Robert Andrews ed., 1993)). As a result of Smith's failed
effort, the web of sexual harassment has truly become tangled in the mass of court opinions,
agency guidelines, and law review articles on the subject. This is not to say that the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 is ineffective. It is, rather, a plea for Legislators to "practise quite a
while" and draft their proposals carefully, even when they are merely attempting to defeat a
bill.
6. While in theory these are different claims, in fact "the line between the two is not
always clear and the two forms of harassment often occur together." Policy Guidance on
Current Issues of Sexual Harassment, EEOC Notice No. N-915-050 ( 1990) [hereinafter EEOC
Notice No. N-915-050]. For example, the line separating quid pro quo harassment and
sexually hostile work environment harassment blurs when an employee is constructively
discharged because of sexually hostile work conditions, or when a supervisor abuses his or her
authority over employment-related decisions to force the victim to participate in sexual conduct.
Id.
7. 29 C.P.R. § 1604.11(a)(2) (1993).
8. The EEOC is currently considering a regulation that would break "hostile work
environment harassment" into "gender hostile harassment" and "sexually hostile harassment."
Presently, "hostile work environment harassment" encompasses two areas: (1) harassment
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has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's
work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
working environment. " 9 This type of harassment ranges from conduct
directed at or towards an employee, such as continual requests for sexual
favors, obscene or suggestive comments to the victim, ogling, demeaning
drawings of the victim, and unwanted touching, to conduct indirectly
affecting the employee, such as lewd jokes, vulgar language, and
prominent displays of pornography. Sexually hostile work environment
harassment primarily affects the victim psychologically and typically does
not lead to the same type of economic injury that accompanies quid pro
quo cases.
While victims of sexually hostile work environment
harassment are not forced to leave their jobs as a direct result of such
conduct, they may feel compelled to quit because their day-to-day
working conditions are intolerable.
Because sexually hostile work environment harassment is typically
embodied in words and attitudes toward the victim, rather than in
physical sexual demands, it is often much more difficult to identify than
quid pro quo harassment. As a result of this difficulty, the definition of
sexually hostile work environment harassment continues to evolve as the
courts and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
attempt to piece together the elements, actions, and intentions that
underlie this cause of action. 10 This ongoing evolution can be frustrat-

taking the form of explicitly sexual conduct, which falls under the definitions of both "quid pro
quo harassment" and "sexually hostile work environment harassment," and (2) nonsexual
hostile environment harassment directed toward an employee because of her or his gender,
which also falls under the definition of "sexually hostile work environment harassment."
Under the EEOC's proposal, the second area-nonsexual hostile environment harassment
because of gender-would be renamed "gender hostile harassment" and would be treated
independently from sexual harassment. The proposed regulation reads:
(b)(l) Harassment is verbal or physical conduct that denigrates or shows hostility or
aversion toward an individual because ofhis/her race, color, religion, gender, national
origin, age, or disability, or that of his/her relatives, friends, or associates, and that:
(i) Has the purpose or effect of creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
work environment;
(ii) Has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's
work performance; or
(iii) Otherwise adversely affects an individual's employment opportunities.
58 Fed. Reg. 51,266 (1993) (to be codified at 29 C.P.R. §§ 1609.1, 1609.2).
For examples of gender hostile harassment (referred to as sexual harassment), see Hall
v. Gus Construction Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1014 (8th Cir. 1988) (finding harassment is not
sexual in nature but would not have occurred but for the sex of the victim); Robinson v.
Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1522 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (finding that although
sexually explicit content is absent from harassing conduct, if the conduct is directed at women
and is motivated by hostility towards women, it is sex discrimination).
9. 29 C.P.R. § 1604.ll(a) (1993).
10. See Karibian v. Columbia University, 14 F.3d 773, 777 (2nd Cir. 1994).
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ing to an employer attempting to develop concrete sexual harassment
guidelines for its employees.
In light of this frustration, the purpose of this comment is to help the
employer understand and plan for the expanding and changing definition
of a sexually hostile work environment. 11 This comment will accomplish its aim in four parts: Part II will present an overview of the statutes
and judicial decisions on sexually hostile work environment harassment, 12 with special attention to Supreme Court rulings. 13 Part III will
examine several recent interpretations of sexually hostile work environment harassment, presenting three cases holding that employers may be
liable for the actions of their employees. Finally, Part IV will conclude
with suggestions on how employers can anticipate and address sexually
hostile conduct in the workplace.
II.

A.

BACKGROUND

1ltle VII: The Sexual Harassment Statute

Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to protect broad classes
of employees from discrimination in the workplace. The Act states that
"[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin." 14 But it was not until
the Title VII amendments in 1972, eight years after sex had been added
to the protected classes of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, that Congress
began to take Congressman Smith's addition15 seriously. In straightforward terms, Congress stated that "[d]iscrimination against women is no
less serious than other forms of prohibited employment practices and is
to be accorded the same degree of social concern given to any type of

11. This comment focuses primarily on sexually hostile work environment and will deal
with quid pro quo harassment only in passing. For additional information on quid pro quo
harassment, see generally CATHARINE A. MACKlNNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING
WOMEN 32-47 (1979); Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REv. 813 (1991); Christopher
P. Barton, Note, Between the Boss and a Hard Place: A Consideration of Meritor Savings
Bank, FSB v. Vinson and the Law of Sexual Harassment, 67 B.U. L. REv. 445 (1987).
12. The decisions discussed and cited in this comment represent only a small percentage
of the decisions addressing sexually hostile work environment harassment. Several important
decisions are not treated in this comment because of space limitations.
13. The decisions discussed also have significance for the more general category of
employment discrimination. In several respects the sexual harassment decisions are a
microcosm of broader ideological shifts that have occurred in employment law over the last
three decades.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988).
15. See supra Part I.
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unlawful discrimination. " 16 Since that statement, the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 has become the backbone of both quid pro quo cases and
sexually hostile work environment cases.

B.

The EEOC Guidelines on Sexual Harassment

The Civil Rights Act of 1964 created the EEOC to investigate claims
of employment discrimination under Title VII and to enforce the Act. 17
The Commission began operations in July 1965, but it did not release its
official Sexual Harassment Guidelines until April 1980. 18 In the first
draft of the Guidelines, the EEOC defined sexual harassment as
"unwelcome behavior" and delineated standards for discerning between
a non-harassing, "purely personal, social" conduct and harassing
conduct. 19 After the requisite comment period, the EEOC modified the
language of the Guidelines to state that:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when (1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or
implicitly a term or condition of an individual's employment, (2)
submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as
the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such
conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an
individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive working environment. 20

16. H.R. REP. No. 92-238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1971). SeeS. REP. No. 92-415,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1971) ("While some have looked at ... women's rights as a frivolous
divertissement, this Committee believes that discrimination against women is no less serious
than other prohibited forms of discrimination, and that it is to be accorded the same degree of
concern given to any type of similarly unlawful conduct."); H.R. REP. No. 92-238, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1971) ("[W]omen are placed in the Jess challenging, the less responsible
and the less renumerative positions on the basis of their sex alone. Such blatantly disparate
treatment is particularly objectionable in view of the fact that Title VII has specifically
prohibited sex discrimination since its enactment in 1964. ");Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983,
987 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1988). See Griggsv. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,433-34
(1971). In addition to enforcing the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the EEOC also negotiates claims
and provides plaintiffs with notices to sue if the negotiations fail. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b).
The President appoints the five members of the EEOC with the consent of the Senate, and each
member serves for five years. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(a).
18. 42 C.P.R. § 1604.11 (1980).
19. 45 Fed. Reg. 25024 (1980).
20. 29 C.P.R. § 1604.11(a) (1980). For insights into the history of the EEOC
Guidelines see J. Clay Smith, Jr., Prologue to the EEOC Guidelines on Sexual Harassment,
10 CAP. U. L. REv. 471 (1981).
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Although this definition has not been changed since it was codified in
1980, 21 the EEOC has supplemented the Guideline's language through
notices regarding sexually hostile work environment harassment. For
example, in 1988 the EEOC issued a notice stating that in determining
whether harassment is sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile
environment, the harasser's conduct should be evaluated from the
objective standpoint of a reasonable person. 22
Another notice, issued by the Commission in 1990, dealt with issues
such as "unwelcome" sexual conduct, elements of a hostile work
environment, employer liability for harassment by supervisors, and
employer response to sexual harassment claims. 23 For sexual conduct
to be "unwelcome," counseled the EEOC, the conduct must be unwelcome "in the sense that the employee did not solicit or incite it, and in
the sense that the employee regarded the conduct as undesirable or offensive. " 24 In many cases, this requires that the victim take some affirmative step to indicate that the offending conduct is unwelcome, including
making a contemporaneous claim or protest. 25
But unwelcome conduct alone does not give rise to a hostile
environment claim. The 1990 EEOC notice defined additional factors of
a sexually hostile environment, including:
(1) whether the conduct was verbal or physical, or both; (2) how
frequently it was repeated; (3) whether the conduct was hostile and
patently offensive; (4) whether the alleged harasser was a co-worker or
a supervisor; (5) whether others joined in perpetrating the harassment;
and (6) whether the harassment was directed at more than one
individual. 26

The Commission stated that in order to determine whether unwelcome
sexual conduct is harassing, "the central inquiry is whether the conduct
'unreasonably interfer[es] with an individual's work performance' or

21. Compare 29 C.P.R. § 1604.ll(a) (1980) with 29 C.P.R. § 1604.ll(a) (1993) (no
change in the language of the regulation since it was originally enacted).
22. See Policy Guidance on Current Issues of Sexual Harassment, EEOC Notice No.
915.035 (1988) [hereinafter EEOC Notice No. 915.035].
23. EEOC Notice No. N-915-050. This notice was in response to Meritor Sav. Bank,
FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). See Part II.C.
24. EEOC Notice No. N-915-050 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897,
903 (11th Cir. 1982)).
25. The EEOC defines a "contemporaneous" complaint or protest as one "made while
the harassment is ongoing or shortly after it has ceased." /d. at n.7.
26. RobertS. Adler & Ellen R. Peirce, The Legal, Ethical, and Social Implications of
the "Reasonable Woman" Standard in Sexual Harassment Cases, 61 FoRDHAM L. REv. 773,
793 (1993); see EEOC Notice No. N-915-050.
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creates 'an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment. "' 27
This implies that less serious offenses such as sexual flirtation, sexual
innuendo, and vulgar language that is trivial or merely annoying will
probably not create a sexually hostile environment. 28 Additionally, the
EEOC stated that if the conduct would not unreasonably interfere with or
"substantially affect the work environment of a reasonable person, no
violation should be found. " 29
Most importantly, the 1990 notice contains the Commissions's
position regarding employer liability in a hostile work environment. To
determine if .an employer is liable for a sexually hostile work environment, the Commission30 will look at three factors: (1) whether the
harassing supervisor was acting in an "agency capacity, " 31 (2) whether
"the employer had an appropriate and effective complaint procedure, " 32
and (3) whether the victim used the employer's complaint procedure. 33
The EEOC will also examine whether the employer had actual or
constructive knowledge ot the harassment. If the employer knew or
should have known and "failed to take immediate and appropriate
corrective action, the employer would be directly liable. " 34
As the definition of sexually hostile work environment harassment
continues to evolve, the EEOC will undoubtedly continue to issue
additional guidance on the subject. Currently the EEOC is considering
guidelines proposed in 1993 that remove non-sexual gender harassment
from the umbrella of sexual harassment, 35 a move that will allow courts
and the EEOC to better focus their definition of sexually hostile work
environment harassment.

C.
1.

Supreme Court Decisions

The Court Defines Sexually Hostile Work Environment in Meritor

The Supreme Court heard its first sexually hostile work environment
harassment case in 1986. In Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 36
Mechelle Vinson, an assistant branch manager with Meritor Savings

27. EEOC Notice No. N-915-050 (quoting 29 C.P.R.§ 1604.11(a)(3) (1989)).
28. ld.
29. ld.
30. The courts are also likely to follow this criteria. See infra Part IV.
31. 29 C.P.R. § 1604.11(c) (1989).
32. EEOC Notice No. N-915-050.
33. ld.
34. ld.
35. See supra note 8. The proposed guidelines will only affect conduct that is non-sexual
in nature. See 58 Fed. Rep. 51,266 (1993).
36. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
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Bank, charged that Sidney Taylor, the manager of the office where she
worked, subjected her to three years of sexual harassment and sexual
abuse. Taylor allegedly propositioned Vinson soon after she began
working at the bank and then made repeated demands for sexual
favors. 37 Vinson testified that she submitted to these demands for fear
of losing her job and estimated that she had intercourse with Taylor
between forty and fifty times over a three-year period. 38 In addition,
Vinson alleged that Taylor fondled her, exposed himself to her, and even
forcibly raped her. 39
After hearing testimony, the district court held that Vinson's sexual
relationship with Taylor was "voluntary" and therefore she '"was not the
victim of sexual harassment and was not the victim of sexual discrimination' while employed at the bank. " 40 The Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia reversed and remanded the case. 41 The Supreme
Court ultimately granted certiorari and unanimously affirmed the reversal,
allowing Vinson to go forward with her claim of sexually hostile work
environment harassment. 42
The Supreme Court did not decide Meritor until nearly a decade after
the first case in which the lower courts recognized sexually hostile work
environment discrimination as a viable cause of action. 43 Because of
this delay, the Court's decision was, in many respects, anti-climactic. In
fact, in Meritor the Court did little more than recognize that hostile
environment harassment exists when sexual conduct has "the purpose or
effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance
or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive working environment, " 44
a fact that the EEOC and many courts had assumed for years. 45
This is not to say that the Meritor opinion is insignificant. The value
of Meritor lies in its delineation of the elements required to establish a
claim based on a hostile work environment. According to a unanimous
Court, in order to show a sexually hostile work environment a plaintiff
must prove that: (1) sex-based discriminatory harassment occurred with
respect to "terms, conditions, or privileges" of employment under Title

37.
38.
39.
40.

/d. at 60.

/d.
/d.
/d. at 61 (quoting Vinson v. Taylor, 22 EPD 130,708, p. 14,693, n.l (D.C. 1980)).
41. /d. at 62.
42. /d. at 63.
43. The first case to recognize sexual harassment as a cause of action was Williams v.
Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976).
44. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65.
45. See, e.g., 29 C.P.R.§ 1604.11(a) (1980); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897
(11th Cir. 1982).
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VII, 46 (2) the harassment was sufficiently pervasive or severe to alter the
condition of employment and create an abusive working environment, 47
(3) the conduct was unwelcome, 48 and (4) the employer did not provide
a reasonable avenue for complaint or, alternatively, knew of the
harassment but did nothing about it. 49 The Court emphasized a subjective approach to determine whether harassment occurred, stating that the
"correct inquiry" for a sexual harassment case is whether the victim "by
her conduct indicated that the alleged sexual advances were unwelcome."so
The Meritor decision is also significant for two additional reasons.
First, the Meritor Court unanimously allowed a claim even when the
harassment produced no direct economic injury. 51 Second, the Court
ruled that employers were not strictly liable for the harassing acts of
supervisory employees in hostile work environment cases. 52 Thus, even
after a plaintiff establishes that harassment at the workplace was "severe
or pervasive, " 53 an employer might still avoid liability by showing that
it was unaware of and did not approve of the supervisor's actions. 54
2.

The Supreme Court Refines Its Definition in Harris

In November of 1993, the Supreme Court refined its definition of
sexually hostile work environment harassment when it decided Harris v.
Forklift Systems, 55 adding an objective standard to the Meritor subjective
standard. In Harris, Teresa Harris, a manager at Forklift Systems, Inc.,
was frequently insulted and made the target of unwanted sexual innuendoes by Forklift's president, Charles Hardy. Hardy's comments, made
in the presence of other employees, included "You're a woman, what do
you know?" and "We need a man as the rental manager. " 56 Further,
on one occasion Hardy suggested that he and Harris "go to the Holiday
Inn to negotiate [Harris's] raise" 57 and would occasionally ask Harris

46. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 63 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l)).
47. !d. at 67 (quoting Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 957 (1971)).
48. !d. at 68.
49. /d. at 69-72; see Kotcher v. Rosa & Sullivan Appliance Center, Inc., 957 F.2d 59,
62 (2d Cir. 1992).
50. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68.
51. /d. at 64.
52. !d. at 72.
53. /d. at 67.
54. See Martha Chamallas, Writing About Sexual Harassment: A Guide to the Literature,
4 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 37, 43 (1993).
55. 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
56. /d. at 369.
57. !d.
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and other female employees to retrieve coins from his front pants
pockets.
When Harris complained to Hardy about his conduct, Hardy replied
that he was only joking and promised to stop. Based on Hardy's promise, Harris continued to work at Forklift. But despite his promise, Hardy
did not end his harassing behavior. When Harris successfully arranged
an important deal with one of Forklift's customers, Hardy asked her,
"What did you do, promise the guy ... some [sex] Saturday night?" 58
After this remark, Harris immediately quit her job at Forklift and sued,
alleging that Hardy's behavior created a sexually hostile work environment.59
While recognizing that some of Hardy's comments offended Harris
and would be offensive to the reasonable person, the district court held
that Hardy's conduct did not create a hostile environment because it was
not so severe that it seriously affected Harris's psychological wellbeing. 60 Because the district court had closely followed circuit precedent, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment in a brief,
unpublished opinion. 61
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address whether conduct
must seriously affect the psychological well-being of an employee or lead
the employee to suffer injury in order to be actionable. The Court, in a
unanimous decision written by Justice O'Connor, adopted a standard that
"takes a middle path between making actionable any conduct that is
merely offensive and requiring the conduct to cause a tangible psychological injury. " 62 To accomplish this, the Court added an objective
standard to the Meritor subjective standard, ruling that discrimination
occurs when conduct is severe or pervasive enough to create an
objectively hostile work environment that the victim perceives to be
abusive. 63 The Court stated that to be actionable, the conduct must be
more than the mere utterance of an epithet that engenders offensive
feelings in an employee, but that Title VII would come into play before
the harassing conduct leads to a nervous breakdown. 64
"Unwelcomeness" and "severity or pervasiveness" are still required elements of
the prima facie sexual harassment case. 65 In her concurring opinion,

58. ld.
59. ld.
60. ld. at 372. The Supreme Court noted that the district court, in focusing on the employee's psychological well-being, was following Sixth Circuit precedent. /d.
61. ld. at 370.
62. ld.
63. ld. at 370-71.
64. ld. at 371.
65. ld.
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Justice Ginsburg added that the "critical issue ... is whether members
of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of
employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed. " 66
III.

EVIDENCE OF EXPANDING EMPLOYER LIABILITY: LIABILITY FOR
SEXUALLY CHARGED RUMORS AND LOVE LETIERS

While the facts of Meritor and Harris are arguably obvious examples
of sexual harassment, employer liability for hostile work environment
harassment has recently begun to included acts that might once have been
considered trivial. The Southern District of Iowa and the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals have both held that rumors in the workplace can create
a prima facie case of sexual harassment, and that the employer can be
held liable for not stopping the rumors. 67 The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals has held that love letters can create a sexually hostile work
environment and, if not dealt with promptly and correctly, can lead to
employer liability. 68

A.
1.

Rumor Cases

Rumors Part I: Jew v. University of Iowa

The earliest case dealing with employer liability for rumors, Jew v.
University of Iowa, 69 arose in the Southern District of Iowa in 1990. In
1973, the Department of Anatomy at the University of Iowa's College of
Medicine was split between those faculty members who supported the
department head, Dr. Williams, and those who opposed him. 70 During
this time, Dr. Jew, who was a long-time friend and supporter of Dr.
Williams, came to work in the Department. Rumors soon began
circulating among the faculty members that Dr. Jew was gaining
favorable treatment because of a sexual relationship she was having with
Dr. Williams. 71 The rumors eventually went outside of the Department,
circulating within the University, the community, and even "to faculty of
other institutions at national professional meetings of anatomists and
neuroscientists. "n

66. !d. at 372.
67. Jew v. University oflowa, 749 F. Supp. 946 (S.D. Iowa 1990); Spain v. Gallegos,
26 F.3d 439 (3d Cir. 1994).
68. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1990).
69. 749 F. Supp. 946.
70. !d. at 948-49.
71. /d. at 949.
72. /d. at 950.
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Several male faculty members, two of whom voted against Jew's
promotion to full professorship, directed sexually explicit comments and
physical conduct towards Dr. Jew, claiming that she was using her sex
as a tool to better her position in the Department. 73 For example, over
the course of several years one faculty member periodically posted
sexually suggestive cartoons and pictures identifying Dr. Jew and Dr.
Williams where they could be seen by faculty and students in the Department. 74 Another faculty member yelled sexual epithets at Dr. Jew as
she walked down a hall, calling her names such as "slut" and
"whore. " 75 This conduct, combined with numerous anonymous acts
ranging from dirty limericks on bathroom walls to "sexually derogatory"
notes, 76 resulted in vicious rumors about Dr. Jew and her relationship
with Dr. Williams. Dr. Jew claimed that these left her feeling "hurt,
humiliated, and ashamed" and caused her to experience physical health
problems. 77
Applying a five-part sexually hostile work environment test, 78 the
district court found for Dr. Jew. The court concluded that the rumors
constituted sexual harassment because they falsely accused Dr. Jew of
using "her sex as a tool for gaining favor, influence and power with the
Head of the Department, a man, and suggested that her professional
accomplishments rested on sexual achievements rather than achievements
of merit. " 79 In meeting the court's five-part test, Jew successfully
showed that: (1) she belonged to a protected group; (2) she was subject
to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) the harassment was based on sex;
(4) the harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment; and (5) her employer knew or should have known of the harassment in question and failed to take proper remedial action. 80 The

73. !d. at 949-53.
74. !d. at 949.
75. !d.
76. !d. at 950.
77. !d. at 951.
78. !d. at 958.
79. !d.
80. !d. at 958-59. This test was adopted by the Eighth Circuit in Moylan v. Maries
County, 792 F.2d 746 (8th Cir. 1986). In Moylan, the Maries County Sheriff repeatedly carne
into a female dispatcher's office during working hours and harassed her by attempting to kiss
her, put his arms around her, and fondle her. !d. at 749. Eventually the sheriff trapped the
dispatcher on a couch and raped her. !d. at 748. The dispatcher brought an action under Title
VII, alleging sexual harassment. The district court dismissed the claim, holding that the
plaintiff had failed to establish a Title VII sexual harassment claim because she failed to prove
quid pro quo harassment by showing that participation in the sexual activity was a condition
of her employment. !d. at 747. In its decision, the district court focused exclusively on the
elements of quid pro quo harassment and failed to consider the claim based on a sexually
hostile work environment. ld. at 748.
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district court judge additionally held that the University had a responsibility to stop the rumors and ordered the University to promote Jew to a
full professor and to pay her back-pay from the date that she should have
been promoted.

2.

Rumors Part II: Spain v. Gallegos

The issue of employer liability for office rumors was recently
addressed again in Spain v. Gallegos. 81 In 1974, Ellen Spain was hired
as an investigator in the EEOC Pittsburgh Area Office. As her career
progressed, Spain took positions at other offices but eventually returned
to the Pittsburgh Area Office in 1983. 82 Between 1983 and 1986 Spain
was passed over for several promotions and filed an internal EEOC
complaint alleging racial and sexual discrimination. 83 Shortly after she
filed the complaint, Spain was approached by Eugene Nelson, her
superior, who convinced her not to proceed on the complaint by
promising her that she would receive the next promotion if she would
periodically loan him money. 84 Despite EEOC regulations precluding
a superior EEOC official from soliciting and accepting loans from a
subordinate employee, 85 Spain agreed to his requests. 86 As promised,
she obtained the next promotion in early 1986. 87
Nelson began demanding loans shortly after Spain received the
promotion, repeating the demands every four to eight weeks over the next
few years. 88 Since it was against regulations for Nelson to solicit the
loans, he met with her privately to ask for loans, to receive the funds,
and to pay them back. 89 Nelson's frequent demands for loans led other

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court and adopted a five part test
from the Eleventh Circuit to determine whether a plaintiff has prevailed on a hostile work
environment sexual harassment claim. ld. at 749 (citing Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d
897, 903-05 (11th Cir. 1982)). The test requires the plaintiff to allege and prove that (1) he
or she belongs to a protected class, (2) he or she was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment,
(3) the harassment was based on sex, (4) the harassment affected a "term, condition, or
privilege" of employment, and (5) the employer knew or should have known of the harassment
and failed to take proper remedial action. See Hall v. Gus Construction Co., 842 F.2d 1010,
1013 (8th Cir. 1988); Moylan, 792 F.2d at 749; Dornhecker v. Malibu Grand Prix Corp., 828
F.2d 307, 309 n. 3 (5th Cir. 1987); Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 633 (6th Cir. 1987).
81. 26 F.3d 439 (3d Cir. 1994).
82. Brief for Appellee at 4, Spain v. Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439 (3d Cir. 1994) (No. 933467).
83. Spain, 26 F.3d at 442.
84. ld.
85. 29 C.P.R. § 1600.735-203 (1993).
86. Spain, 26 F.3d at 442.
87. ld.
88. ld.
89. ld.
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employees to often see them together privately in his office, the cafeteria,
or leaving the office. 90 Over the years rumors developed in the Pittsburgh office that Spain and Nelson were having an affair. 91
During casual conversation between 1986 and 1989, Spain heard the
rumors that she was having an affair with Nelson. 92 She complained to
Nelson about the rumors about four times a year until 1989. 93 In spite
of these complaints, the private meetings and loan requests continued,
perpetuating the rumors. In late 1989 or early 1990, Spain told Nelson
that she would no longer lend him money. 94 Because of this, Nelson
allegedly escalated his harassment, ultimately resulting in Spain being
denied a promotion as a result of the rumors. 95
In her complaint Spain alleged that the rumors and Nelson's
continued conduct "in the face of the rumors embarrassed Spain ... and
caused her co-workers to ostracize her. " 96 As a result, her relationship
with her co-workers and her supervisors became strained, "making her
feel miserable and unable to 'deal with the situation. '" 97 Spain ultimately brought an action in district court alleging that she had been subject to
sexual harassment arising from the false rumors. 98
The district court ruled sua sponte that it would not allow Spain to
proceed on her sexually hostile work environment harassment claim based
on "Nelson's failure to stop the false rumors in the workplace that he and
Spain were having an affair" and dismissed the action. 99 On appeal, the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the district court decision and
held that Spain had stated a prima facie case of sexual harassment.
The court stated that five elements must exist in order to successfully
show a sexually hostile work environment under Title VII: (1) the
employees suffered intentional discrimination because of their sex, (2) the
discrimination was pervasive and regular, (3) the discrimination
detrimentally affected the plaintiff, (4) the discrimination would
detrimentally affect a reasonable person of the same sex in that position,

90. ld.
91. ld. A supervisor in the Pittsburgh office testified that he heard rumors that Spain
and Nelson had "a relationship going on" and that he was told by a co-worker, "Be careful,
you don't want to rub Ellen Spain the wrong way, because if you do, then you're going to have
problems with the Director." ld. at n.4.
92. ld. at 442.
93. ]d.
94. ld.
95. ld.
96. ld.
97. ld.
98. ld. at 443.
99. ld. at 444.
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and (5) the existence of respondeat superior liability. 100 The court,
following Meritor and Harris, noted that these elements included both a
subjective standard-conduct affecting the plaintiff-and an objective
standard-conduct affecting a reasonable person. 101
The court determined that Spain satisfied the first element-the
employee suffered intentional discrimination because of her sex-with her
evidence concerning the rumors and their effects on her environment and
advancement. The court found that this element was "satisfied because
the crux of the rumors and their impact upon Spain [was] that Spain, a
female, subordinate employee, had a sexual relationship with her male
superior. " 102 This type of rumor, the court continued, carries negative
implications in our society when applied to a woman and can cause
"superiors and co-workers to treat women in the workplace differently
from men. " 103 The court determined that if Spain had been a male,
rumors would not have circulated that she had influence over Nelson
through physically using her sex. 104 In fact, "even if a male had a rela-·
tionship bringing him into repeated close contact with Nelson, it would
have been less likely for co-workers to have believed that the relationship
had a sexual basis. " 105 Thus, the court concluded, Spain suffered

100. These five elements were originally identified by the court in Andrews v. City of
Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469 (3d Cir. 1990). The Andrews case concerned two female police
officers who were members of the Accident Investigation Division of the Philadelphia Police
Department. Pornography and vulgar, sexist language were common in the Division, and
testimony was presented that the Division '"was one of the [most] sexist, racist units in the
Police Department."' ld. at 1472. Both of the female officers were repeatedly harassed and
hassled because of their sex. The harassment ranged from derogatory comments to stealing
case files, and eventually resulted in physical injury to one of the female officers when a "lime
substance" was put in her shirt. ld. at 1474.
The Andrews court applied the Meritor subjective standard, recognizing that pornography
and obscene language could be viewed as highly offensive to women who seek to deal with
their colleagues "without the barrier of sexual differentiation and abuse." ld. at 1485-86 (citing
Bennet v. Corroon & Black Corp., 845 F.2d 104, 106 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1020
(1988)). The court stated that "[a]lthough men may find these actions harmless and innocent,
it is highly possible that women may feel otherwise." Jd. at 1486.
101. In Andrews, the court explained how much weight it would give to each factor,
stating that:
[t]he subjective factor is crucial because it demonstrates that the alleged conduct
injured this particular plaintiff giving her a claim for judicial relief. The objective
factor, however, is the more critical for it is here that the finder of fact must actually
determine whether the work environment is sexually hostile.
/d. at 1483. In the time between Andrews and Spain, the Supreme Court affirmed that a hostile
work environment claim must contain both objective and subjective harm. See supra Part
III.C.2.
102. Spain, 26 F.3d at 448.
103. ld.
104. ld.
105. ld.
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discrimination because she was female that she would not have suffered
had she been a male.
Spain established the second requirement for demonstrating a
sexually hostile work environment through evidence that "the rumors
developed over a period of several years between 1986 and 1990 and
manifested themselves through [Spain's] continuous interaction with her
colleagues and supervisors. " 106 In addition, the court found that
Nelson's loan requests occurred during the same time as the rumors,
continuing even after Spain asked him to "put an end to the rumors. " 107
The court determined that Spain had met the third element-that the
discrimination affected Spain detrimentally-through evidence that her
relationship with her co-workers and supervisors deteriorated as a result
of the rumors. 108 The court acknowledged that employees are free to
associate with whomever they wish to, but held that if sexually based
rumors influenced their decision not to associate with another employee,
that employee would likely be a victim of sexual discrimination. 109
The court held that the fourth element was met for many of the same
reasons that the third element was met. It held that Spain had described
a situation in which a reasonable person would have been detrimentally
affected by the unfriendly environment she faced. 110
Finally, the court found that because Spain's superiors were aware
of the rumors and did nothing to stop them, the fifth element-the
existence of respondeat superior liability-was automatically met. 111
Based on this and the preceding findings, the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals unanimously reversed the district court and allowed Spain to
proceed on her sexual harassment claim against her employer, the EEOC.
B.

Love Letters

Recently, love letters also have been found to contribute to a sexually
hostile work environment. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed
employer liability for employee love letters in Ellison v. Brady. 112 In
Ellison, Kerry Ellison and Sterling Gray both worked as agents for the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in San Mateo, California. Although they
did not work closely together and were not friends, Ellison accepted an

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

ld. at 449.
ld.
ld.
ld. at 449-50.
ld. at 450.
111. ld.
112. 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1990).

341]

SEX, LOVE LEITERS, AND VICIOUS RUMORS

357

invitation to go to lunch with Gray to lunch in June of 1986. 113 In the
four months that followed, Gray pestered Ellison with invitations for
lunch and after-work drinks. Ellison declined the invitations, eventually
making a point to avoid Gray during lunch time. 114
In October 1986, Gray handed a note to Ellison on which he had
written: "I cried over you last night and I'm totally drained today. I have
never been in such constant term oil [sic]. Thank you for talking with
me. I could not stand to feel your hatred for another day. " 115 When
Ellison read the note "she became shocked and frightened and left the
room. " 116 Ellison reported the note to her supervisor but asked the
supervisor to let her handle it. Ellison had no contact with Gray for the
rest of the week. 117
On the following Monday, Ellison left for a four-week training
session in St. Louis, Missouri. While she was there, she received a card
and a three-page typed, single spaced letter from Gray. The letter read,
in part:
I know that you are worth knowing with or without sex. . . . Leaving
aside the hassles and disasters of recent weeks. I have enjoyed you so
much over these past few months. Watching you. Experiencing you
from 0 so fur away. Admiring your style and elan. . . . Don't you
think it odd that two people who have never even talked together, alone,
are striking off such intense sparks ... I will [write] another letter in
the near future. 118

After reading the letter, Ellison promptly telephoned her supervisor
and requested that either she or Gray be transferred to a different
office. 119 Gray was subsequently transferred to the San Francisco
office, and neither Ellison nor her supervisor said anything more on the
subject. 120 Three weeks after his transfer, Gray filed union grievances
requesting that he be reinstated at the San Mateo office. 121 The IRS
agreed to allow Gray to transfer back to San Mateo on the condition that
he would leave Ellison alone. 122

113. /d. at 873.
114. /d.
115. /d. at 874.
116. /d.
117. ld.
118. /d. Ellison described the letter as "twenty times, a hundred times weirder" than the
prior note. /d.
119. /d.
120. /d.
121. [d.
122. /d.
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In early 1987, Ellison learned that Gray would be returning to her
office. Two days later she filed a formal complaint with the IRS alleging
sexual harassment, and obtained permission to temporarily transfer to the
San Francisco office when Gray returned} 23 The Treasury Department
ultimately denied Ellison's sexual harassment claim on the basis that it
did not describe a pattern or practice of sexual harassment, and the
EEOC affirmed on appeal. 124 Soon thereafter Ellison filed a complaint
in federal district court. 125 The court granted summary judgment to the
government on the basis that Ellison had failed to state a prima facie case
of sexually hostile work environment harassment. 126
Ellison appealed the grant of summary judgment to the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals which overturned the district court decision. 127 While
the court conceded that Gray's conduct fell "somewhere between forcible
rape and the mere utterance of an epithet, " 128 and that the conduct was
not particularly pervasive, 129 it nonetheless held that Gray's conduct
gave rise to a claim for sexually hostile work environment harassment.130 The circuit court stated that a reasonable woman could
consider Gray's conduct "sufficiently severe and pervasive to alter a
condition of employment and create an abusive working environment. " 131
In holding that the IRS could be liable for sexually hostile work
environment harassment, the court stated that it was not sufficient to
merely transfer Gray and tell him to stop his conduct. Rather, the court
suggested that a proper response from the IRS would have been to
"express strong disapproval of Gray's conduct, ... remand Gray, ...
put him on probation, and . . . inform him that repeated harassment
would result in suspension or termination. " 132 Additionally, the court
stated, "[w]e believe that in some cases the mere presence of an
employee who has engaged in particularly severe or pervasive harassment
can create a hostile working environment. " 133

123. ld.
124. ld. at 875. The EEOC affirmed the Treasury's decision on different grounds,
concluding that the IRS took adequate action to prevent Gray's harassment in the future. !d.
125. ld.
126. ld.
127. ld. at 883.
128. ld. at 877 (citing Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)).
129. ld.
130. ld. at 880.
131. ld.
132. ld. at 882.
133. ld. at 883.
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DRAFTING AN EFFECI'IVE SEXUALLY HOSTILE WoRK
ENVIRONMENT POLICY

Taken together, Jew, Spain, and Ellison demonstrate an evolving
definition of what constitutes a sexually harassing work environment. As
the courts refine the elements of proof required in sexually hostile work
environment claims, they are beginning to focus on discriminatory
behavior that is ongoing and regular, even if the conduct might be
regarded by some as "trivial. " 134 As the courts begin to condemn what
is sometimes viewed as trivial conduct, employers should examine their
own conduct and their employees' working conditions.
The EEOC Guidelines point out that "prevention is the best tool for
elimination of sexual harassment. " 135 The most effective prevention
can be accomplished through a strong company policy that explicitly
forbids harassing conduct. In fact, the new regulations state that one
possible definition of a hostile workplace is any business that does not
have an "explicit policy" against harassment. 136 An effective sexual
harassment policy should do three things: (1) define a sexually harassing
work environment generally, (2) identify specific types of harassing
conduct, and (3) promote compliance with the policy through education,
enforcement, and penalties.
If defining a sexual hostile work environment were a simple task, the
EEOC and the courts would have arrived at a definition long ago. The
remainder of this section will focus on defining a sexually harassing
environment generally, identifying specific harassing conduct, and
offering suggestions regarding how employers can anticipate and address
sexually hostile conduct in the workplace.

134. B. Glenn George recently presented an example addressing the issue of what some
may call "trivial" conduct in the workplace:
Imagine an employer who provides a coffee pot in each male employee's office, but
requires female employees to use a common coffee pot at the end of the hall. The
"trivial" inconvenience of walking a few extra steps to get coffee is hardly "abusive"
and is unlikely to interfere substantially, or even minimally, with a woman's ability
to perform her job. But the symbolic implications are clearly intolerable.
B. Glenn George, The Back Door: Legitimizing Sexual Harassment Claims, 73 B.U. L. REv.
1, 21 (1993). Although this situation describes "gender harassment" under the EEOC's new
guidelines, it is not difficult to imagine "trivial" sexual conduct, such as a supervisor casually
putting his or her hand on an employee's hand while they talk.
135. 29 C.P.R.§ 1604.ll(t) (1993).
136. See 58 Fed. Reg. 51,266.
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Defining A Sexually Harassing Work Environment Generally

Because sexually hostile work environment harassment depends
largely upon the circumstances surrounding particular conduct, employers
should draft a definition that will include the unique circumstances of
their particular business. Several groups, ranging from the EEOC to the
Women's Legal Defense Fund, have written general sexual harassment
definitions which employers can use as models when drafting their own
definition.

1.

Using the EEOC Definitions

Although the EEOC Guidelines and EEOC notices on sexual
harassment are not controlling on the courts, judges often turn to them
because they "constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to
which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance. " 137
Because of this judicial deference to EEOC guidance, employers should
be wary of straying too far from the EEOC definition. Generally, an
employer will want to begin its own definition by quoting the EEOC's
definition of harassment and then expand on it to take into consideration
the employer's unique circumstances.
The current EEOC Guidelines include both quid pro quo and hostile
work environments within the definition of sexual harassment. 138 The
Guidelines state that:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual fuvors, and other
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when (1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or
implicitly a term or condition of an individual's employment, (2)
submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as
the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such
conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an
individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive working environment. 139

In addition to addressing the issues raised in the Guidelines, sexual
harassment definitions should also address issues that have appeared in
EEOC notices and opinions. Employers should remember that EEOC no-

137. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (citing General Elec.
Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 124, 141-42 (1976)); see Ellison, 924 F.2d at 875; Peasev. Alford
Photo Indus., 667 F. Supp. 1188, 1200 (W.O. Tenn. 1987); Gilardi v. Schroeder, 672 F.
Supp. 1043, 1046 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
138. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68.
139. 29 C.P.R. § 1604.11(a) (1993).
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tices have stated that: (1) employer liability for a hostile environment is
based on the employer's negligence in supervising the workplace by
failing to prevent or remedy harassment; (2) sexual harassment is
actionable even if the plaintiff did not resist the sexual advances; (3)
employers are liable for sexual harassment committed in the workplace
by non-employees where the employer knows or should have known of
the harassment but fails to intervene; (4) conduct that is initially welcome
can become unwelcome and form the basis of a complaint; (5) conduct
that is accepted by one individual but not accepted by another can form
the basis of a complaint; (6) an employee does not need to be the direct
target of harassment in order to have a complaint; 140 and (7) being
passed over for a promotion, raise, transfer, etc. in favor of an employee
who is sexually involved with superiors gives rise to a claim of hostile
work environment harassment. 141 Further, in order to avoid employer
liability in hostile work environment cases, an employer's remedies must
be timely and aggressive enough to end the harassment. 142

2.

Using Non-EEOC Definitions

In addition to the EEOC's definition, private non-EEOC definitions
of sexual harassment are also available. Employers can use these nonEEOC definitions either as models for constructing their own definition
or simply as a reference with which to compare their existing definition.
But in using a non-EEOC definition of a sexually hostile work environment an employer takes a risk. If careless, an employer can inadvertently
raise its standard above that required by the EEOC's definition, making
the employer liable for otherwise non-actionable conduct.
Non-EEOC definitions can be gleaned from court opinions, 143
books and articles on sexual harassment, and occasionally from literature
by local or state business associations or chambers of commerce. The
following are several representative non-EEOC definitions of sexual
harassment and sexually hostile work environment harassment:
[Sexual harassment is] [u]nsolicited nonreciprocal . . . behavior that
asserts a [person's] sex role over [his or] her function as worker. It can
be any or all of the following: staring, commenting upon, or touching

140. Simply being subject to an offensive environment forms the basis for a harassment
claim, even if the complainant is not personally harassed.
141. Kathryn Martell & George Sullivan, Strategies for Managers to Recognize & Remedy
Sexual Harassment, INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT, May 1994 at 5; see 29 C.P.R.§ 1604.11
(1993); EEOC Notice No. N-915-050; EEOC Notice No. 915.035.
142. Martell & Sullivan, supra note 140, at 5.
143. The EEOC notices always address Supreme Court opinions and occasionally address
circuit court opinions.
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a [person's] body; requests for acquiescence in sexual behavior;
repeated nonreciprocated propositions for dates; demands for sexual
intercourse; and rape. 144
[Sexual harassment is defined as] [a]ny attention of a sexual nature in
the context of the work situation which has the effect of making a
[person] uncomfortable on the job, impeding [his or] her ability to ..
. work, or interfering with ... employment opportunities. . . . At one
extreme, it is the direct demand for sexual compliance coupled with the
threat of firing if a [person] refuses. At the other, it is being forced to
work in an environment in which, through various means, such as
sexual slurs and/or the public display of derogatory images ... a
[person] is subjected to stress or made to fuel humiliated because of [his
or] her sex. Sexual harassment is behavior which becomes coercive
because it occurs in the employment context, thus threatening both a
[person's] job satisfaction and security. 145
[Sexual harassment is] [a]ny unwelcome sexual attention in the workplace-either explicit or implicit-that involves a person's term or
condition of employment, interferes with their work performance or
creates a hostile work environment. Besides such obvious things as
actual physical assault, sexual harassment also could include: pressure
to go out on dates or to provide sexual favors; sexually explicit pictures
in the workplace; suggestive gestures or remarks; and any kind of
unwelcome physical contact. 146

These definitions and others like them are often more inclusive than
the EEOC's and should therefore be treated cautiously. Regardless of
whether a non-EEOC definition is consulted in the formation of an
employer's definition of sexual harassment, the risk of being too inclusive
or specific must be balanced with the responsibility of the employer to
inform employees of exactly what constitutes sexual harassment. If an
employer's definition is too specific, the employer might be liable for
trivial conduct; if the definition is too general, the courts might hold the
employer liable for failing to issue proper guidelines to its employees.

144. LIN FARLEY, SEXUAL SHAKEDOWN: THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WOMEN ON THE
JOB 14, 15 (1978).
145. Krista J. Schoenheider, Comment, A Theory of Tort Liability for Sexual Harassment
in the Workplace, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 1461 n.2 (quoting WORKING WOMEN'S INST., SEXUAL
HARASSMENT ON THE JoB: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 180 (unpublished manuscript, on file
with the UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REviEw)).
146. Larry Reynolds, Court Rulings and Proposed Regs Will Guide Harassment Policies,
HR Focus, Apr. 1994, at 1. This is the operating definition of sexual harassment used by the
Women's Legal Defense Fund. ld.
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But with the advice of good counsel and with a clear vision of what the
policy should accomplish, an employer can use these definitions as a
model for an effective general definition of sexually hostile work
environment harassment.
B.

Defining Specific Conduct That Constitutes a Sexually Hostile
Work Environment

In addition to defining a sexually hostile work environment generally,
an employer's policy should define specific behavior that constitutes
sexual harassment. The policy should make it clear that the harassment
will be treated as a serious form of misconduct, complete with strong
penalties for harassers. Because the list of actions resulting in harassment
will likely continue to grow, the employer should give examples that
focus on the motivation of the harasser and the feelings and responses of
the victim. The employer can also describe the "warning signs" that
indicate that sexual harassment may be occurring, such as complaints
from members of the opposite sex about conduct or language, indications
that social or sexual invitations are not welcome, and visible emotional
responses such as anger, fear, or crying.
Employers should periodically survey employees to determine
whether problems exist, and if so, what those problems are. For
example, in sexual-harassment awareness meetings, employees who work
together should clarify what compliments, forms of address, etc., are and
are not sexual harassment. If necessary, each person could fill out an
anonymous survey describing acceptable and unacceptable conduct. In
this way, employers and employees can learn specific examples of
sexually hostile conduct directly from other employees.
This is
particularly important in areas where differences exist between various
people's levels of comfort, such as romantic overtures, sexual teasing,
obscene language or jokes and display of suggestive materials. This will
also give the employer an idea if it is necessary to take a conservative
position on co-worker relationships, teasing, personal comments,
touching, and any other behaviors that might make employees feel
unequal or uncomfortable
While each employer should formulate its own list of harassing
conduct, some common examples of potentially harassing behavior should
be incorporated into every policy. These examples can include language,
joking, stereotypes, attempts at romantic relationships, and sexual
advances. Other examples of common harassing conduct include giving
underclothing as a gift, putting a hand on someone's hip or thigh, inviting
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another to a secluded place for sexual talk, and swearing using sexual
terms. 147
Employees should also have clear definitions of what kind of actions
do not make a hostile work environment. A stray rude joke or pat on the
shoulder is typically not harassment, although an oversensitive work
environment may make it seem so. Employers should clearly define
when behavior moves from innocent, sexual non-harassment to sexual
harassment. To label all gifts, compliments, private discussions, touching
and swearing as sexual harassment cheapens the term and gives
employees confused ideas about what actions make a work environment
sexually hostile. 148
Finally, employers and their attorneys should stay abreast of any
current cases or statutes that might affect them. In addition to federal
laws and EEOC requirements, each state has fair employment laws
prohibiting sexual harassment.
For example, some states require
employers to have an anti-harassment policy. 149 Employers should
monitor legal developments at both the state and federal level to ensure
their definition and program meets the current standards.

V.

CONCLUSION

With the decisions in Jew, Spain, and Ellison, an increasingly
difficult picture exists for employers who seek to identify and prevent
sexually hostile work environment harassment. This picture, however,
is manageable. The law still provides an effective safety net for
employers: namely, to state a prima facie hostile environment case, a
plaintiff must show that the employer knew, or should have known, of
the harassment and failed to take remedial action. 150 Even if harassment occurs, liability can be avoided if the employer has an effective
sexual harassment policy and takes timely, appropriate action. 151
In spite of this protection, employers should aggressively address
sexual harassment in their workplaces. Although there is agreement in
the courts on the general premise that employers must work diligently to
prevent sexual harassment in the first place, and remedy it if it occurs,

14 7. See Kara Swisher, Laying Down the Law on Harassment: Coun Rulings Spur Firms
to Take Preventative Tack, WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 1994, at Hl.
148. ld.
149. See, e.g., CAL. Eouc. CODE§ 212.6 (1994) (requiring all educational institutions
to have a sexual harassment policy); CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 10a-55c (1992).
150. See, e.g., Kotcher v. Rosa& Sullivan Appliance Center, Inc., 957 F.2d 59, 62 (2d
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judges and juries have considerable freedom in deciding whether a given
response is sufficient to avoid liability. In light of the lack of consensus
in the courts in defining harassment, employers should take a conservative view of sexually hostile work environment harassment and develop
aggressive, thorough policies and definitions. By drafting a complete,
comprehensive definition of sexually hostile work environment harassment, an employer can successfully protect itself from liability while
concurrently developing a productive, non-hostile workplace.

Chad W King

